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Abstract—Deep neural network (DNN) models are known to be vulnerable to maliciously crafted adversarial examples and to
out-of-distribution inputs drawn sufficiently far away from the training data. How to protect a machine learning model against deception
of both types of destructive inputs remains an open challenge. This paper presents XEnsemble, a diversity ensemble verification
methodology for enhancing the adversarial robustness of DNN models against deception caused by either adversarial examples or
out-of-distribution inputs. XEnsemble by design has three unique capabilities. First, XEnsemble builds diverse input denoising verifiers
by leveraging different data cleaning techniques. Second, XEnsemble develops a disagreement-diversity ensemble learning
methodology for guarding the output of the prediction model against deception. Third, XEnsemble provides a suite of algorithms to
combine input verification and output verification to protect the DNN prediction models from both adversarial examples and out of
distribution inputs. Evaluated using eleven popular adversarial attacks and two representative out-of-distribution datasets, we show that
XEnsemble achieves a high defense success rate against adversarial examples and a high detection success rate against
out-of-distribution data inputs, and outperforms existing representative defense methods with respect to robustness and defensibility.
Index Terms—Robust deep learning, adversarial attack and defense, ensemble method
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP learning has achieved unparalleled success across avariety of machine learning tasks, e.g., image classification
and speech recognition. However, deep neural network (DNN)
models are also known to be vulnerable to deceptive inputs that
are either adversarial examples or out-of-distribution examples.
Adversarial examples [1] are malicious inputs crafted covertly
over benign examples to fool deep learning models to misclassify
without being detected by the human, and out-of-distribution
examples [2] are query inputs whose distribution differs from the
training distribution. Both problems pose potential threats to many
mission-critical systems and applications that use deep learning as
a primary decision-making component, such as real-time object
recognition, self-driving cars and voice command recognition.
The robustness of a DNN model depends on its capability to
survive from the deception vulnerabilities due to both maliciously
crafted adversarial inputs and out-of-distribution inputs. Both
types of deceptive inputs are attributed to the same problem:
the input to the prediction model has been altered maliciously.
Existing defense methods against adversarial examples do not
generalize over different attack algorithms [3]. Different defense
methods tend to have different robustness under either different
attack algorithms or different settings of attack parameters of the
same attack algorithm [4]. Meanwhile, existing out-of-distribution
defenses either have a limited defense success rate [5] on the
adversarial example or fail miserably [6]. In this paper, we make
two arguments. First, a robust defense of a privately trained DNN
model against deception should be capable of shielding the well-
trained prediction model from intentional manipulation with either
maliciously patched inputs or out-of-distribution inputs. Second,
a robust defense solution should be independent of attacks and
should generalize well across different attacks, different datasets,
and different DNN algorithms.
Bearing these problems in mind, we develop a diversity en-
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semble verification methodology, called XEnsemble, to maximize
the adversarial robustness of DNN models against deception. The
design of XEnsemble leverages two unique properties of deceptive
inputs: (1) if an ensemble consists of only weak models whose
prediction accuracy is lower than the victim target model, which
we aim to protect, then we show that such an ensemble of weak
models will be a poor ensemble choice for defending against
deceptive inputs. (2) Not all ensemble teams from well-trained
models can be effective against deception. We show that only those
ensembles that have high fault tolerance in terms of disagreement
diversity and respond to negative examples very differently are the
ensemble teams of high robustness. A distinct property of high
disagreement-diversity ensembles is that their member models
tend to have very different gradient information. This contrasting
gradient information tends to cause the same adversarial examples
to have highly divergent and inconsistent behavior across their
member models. Furthermore, this conflicting gradient informa-
tion provides a distinctive opportunity for a disagreement diversity
ensemble to integrate diverse decision boundaries from its member
models to infer the ensemble decision boundary, which conse-
quently reduces the attack transferability [7] of both adversarial
and out-of-distribution inputs.
In summary, XEnsemble by design is capable of auto-verifying
any input to the prediction model to minimize the detrimental
effects due to malicious and erroneous data inputs. Consider
that adversarial examples are typically generated from their cor-
responding benign examples, XEnsemble should be capable of
auto-repairing the adverse effects caused by adversarial examples
generated by different attack methods, aiming to maximize the
repairing rate for adversarial examples and to achieve a high
prevention success rate (PSR). For those adversarial examples that
escape from the auto-repairing process, we seek to auto-detect
them and filter them out. At the same time, since the out-of-
distribution inputs are drawn far away from the class distribution
of a trained prediction model and are outliers to the prediction
tasks, the defense should maximize the detection success rate
(TSR) for identifying as many out-of-distribution examples as
possible and prune them out.
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(a) Adversarial attacks
(b) Out-of-distribution attack
Fig. 1: Visualization of adversarial attacks and the OOD attack using TinyImageNet to a CIFAR-10 DenseNet classifier.
This paper makes three novel contributions. First, the proposed
XEnsemble approach is attack-independent. It verifies the input to
the prediction model by using multiple diverse input data cleansing
techniques to denoise primarily the adversarial inputs. Then it
verifies the output of the attack target model by creating multiple
failure-independent model verifiers that have high disagreement-
diversity. Second, the proposed XEnsemble approach can effec-
tively increase the adversarial robustness of the attack target DNN
model by maximizing the number of adversarial inputs that can be
auto-repaired and maximizing the number of out-of-distribution
inputs that can be detected. Third but not the least, our XEnsemble
algorithms for auto-verification, auto-repairing, and auto-detection
can generalize well across attack methods since XEnsemble algo-
rithms do not require re-training the DNN model under protection
using existing attack algorithms, and can be easily implemented
on modern neural network architectures and used as a plug-in by
the state of the art deep learning software frameworks. Evaluated
using eleven popular adversarial attacks and two representative
out-of-distribution datasets, we show that XEnsemble approach
can effectively strengthen the robustness of a DNN model under
protection in terms of high attack prevention success rate (PSR) for
adversarial examples and high attack detection success rate(TSR)
for out-of-distribution input when comparing to existing represen-
tative defense techniques. It is also worth noting that the DNN
model under the protection of XEnsemble can further improve its
prediction accuracy in the presence of no attacks.
2 OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 Deceptive Input Artifacts
Adversarial Examples are the input artifacts that are created
from benign inputs by adding adversarial distortions, aiming to
cause the target model to misclassify with high confidence [8].
Adversarial example generation process can be formulated as
min||x− x′||p s.t.f(x′) = y∗, f(x′) 6= f(x),
where y∗ denotes the target class label for targeted attacks or
any label other than the correct class for untargeted attacks. p
is the distance norm, such as L0, L2, and L∞. For a given
adversarial input xadv of a benign image x, L0 norm indicates
the number of pixels of x that are changed in xadv , L2 norm is
the Euclidean distance between x and xadv , and L∞ norm denotes
the maximum change to any pixel of benign input x in xadv . For
targeted attacks, we consider two targets representing two ends of
the attack spectrum: the most-likely attack class in the prediction
vector (yT = arg maxy 6=Cx
−→y , most) and the least-likely attack
class (yT = arg min−→y , LL). Cx is the correctly predicted label
for benign input x. We use eleven attack algorithms from seven
families of attack algorithms to evaluate and compare the per-
formance of defense approaches, including FGSM [8], BIM [9],
PGD [10], CW0, CW2, CW∞ [11], and JSMA [12]. Figure 1a
provides a visualization of adversarial perturbation attack to a
DenseNet classifier well-trained on CIFAR-10. Its prediction on
the benign horse input is a horse with 0.983 confidence. Each
adversarial example generated by one of the 11 attacks causes the
target model to misclassify the horse image into either a bird or
an airplane, with some attacks at high confidence of 1.
Out-of-Distribution(OOD) Inputs are the artifacts of abnor-
mal inputs drawn from a completely different distribution than the
domain of the learning task. OOD inputs can be easily utilized by
an adversary to launch malicious attacks because when deploying
neural networks in real-world applications, there is often very little
control over the test data distribution [2]. Figure 1b shows eleven
OOD examples, which are taken from ImageNet and fed into a
CIFAR-10 DNN classifier. We observe that the cell phone image is
misclassified as an airplane and the apple image is misclassified as
a bird because the DNN classifier is trained using DenseNet on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. However, OODs are considered ill-input data
to this well-trained model, even though the DenseNet CIFAR-10
classifier has 94.8% benign test accuracy. The OODs are either
completely unrecognizable [13] or totally irrelevant to the scope
of the given learning task [14]. For conventional computing pro-
grams, the ill-input data is known to cause detrimental effect either
during the runtime execution or to the output of a program. Thus,
input and output verification mechanisms are typically employed
at both compile time and runtime to ensure their correctness. In
this paper, we argue that there should be no exception to the input
and output of an executable prediction model. XEnsemble presents
a holistic approach to integrating input and output ensemble
learning based verifications for improving the robustness of deep
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learning against deception.
2.2 Adversarial Attack Algorithms
Let x and xadv be a benign input and its adversarial example re-
spectively, f(x; θ) denote the prediction model with θ representing
the neural network parameters, and f(x; θ) takes an input query
example x and outputs −→y and yx as the prediction vector and
predicted class for the benign input x respectively. During the
model training phase, f(x,Cx; θ) is iteratively learned over the
fixed training dataset of {x,Cx}, where Cx denotes the class label
given for training input x. The model parameters θ are updated
through gradient descent optimization using back-propagation on
a loss function, denoted by J(hi(x), Cx) where hi(x) is the
intermediate result at the ith iteration and the training completes
when the convergence condition of the iterative training is met,
which produces f(x; θ) as the resulting prediction model. At the
prediction phase, the prediction model f(x; θ) takes any query
input x and produces the prediction output denoted by −→y and yx.
When adversarial examples are sent to a prediction model, the
goal of untargeted attack [4] is to cause the prediction model to
misclassify. Thus, with xadv = x + ∆x, the attack objective is
to perturb the benign input x with small ∆x to increase the loss
function value J(h(x + ∆x), yx) such that the prediction result
will be altered from the correct class label yx of its benign input
x. By gradient ascent, the attacker needs to decrease the value of
x when the partial gradient is below 0 or to increase the value
of x when the partial gradient is above 0, which will result in
increasing the loss value of J(h(x+ ∆x), yx).
For targeted attacks, the goal of the attacker is changed to
minimize the value of the loss function J(h(x + ∆x), yt) where
yt denotes the attack target class label. Thus, the attacker needs
to decrease the pixel value of benign example x when the partial
gradient is above 0 or to increase the pixel value of x when the
partial gradient is below 0, which will cause to the value of the
loss function J(h(x+ ∆x), yx) to decrease.
White-box attack v.s. Black-box attack. White-box attacks
refer to adversarial examples generated by attackers who have full
knowledge of the prediction model. All attacks that manipulate the
gradient Information are white-box attacks since attackers use the
gradient information of the attack objective to guide the learning
of adversarial perturbation in terms of where (location) and how
much (amount) noise should be injected to a benign input x.
Black-box attacks refer to adversarial examples that are generated
from a surrogate model that an attack generates, which can be
viewed as a shadow model of the private attack target model. By
the transferability of adversarial examples [7], [15], one can launch
black-box attacks using such adversarial examples. One approach
to generating the surrogate model for any privately held prediction
model is to utilize query probing through the model prediction
API and the membership inference [16].
To measure and compare the adverse effect and cost of
adversarial examples generated by different attack algorithms, we
introduce the following six attack evaluation metrics.
Attack Success Rate (ASR) indicates the percentage of
all attack inputs that are successful adversarial examples. An
adversarial example is successful when the attack goal is achieved:
misclassification in untargeted attacks or reaching the target label
in targeted attacks.
Misclassification Rate (MR) is the percentage of adversarial
attack inputs that are misclassified. MR equals to ASR in untar-
geted attacks (UA) and may be larger than ASR in targeted attacks
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
attack attack effect confidence costASR MR AdvConf Perturb Percept Time(s)
FGSM
UA
0.85 0.85 0.8647 0.93 47.63 0.021
BIM 0.92 0.92 0.9645 0.607 18.96 0.154
PGD 0.86 0.86 0.9629 0.2 27.67 0.44
CW∞
most 1 1 0.9889 0.571 15.98 235.5
LL 1 1 0.9779 0.726 26.45 243.2
CW2
most 1 1 0.9867 0.455 6.92 5.772
LL 1 1 0.9732 0.598 13 7.441
CW0
most 1 1 0.9904 1.251 8.003 355.4
LL 1 1 0.9757 1.587 18.11 356.7
JSMA most 1 1 0.5366 1.934 27.12 4.894LL 0.99 1 0.3920 2.338 53.48 9.858
Im
ag
eN
et
FGSM
UA
0.99 0.99 0.6408 1.735 1152 0.019
BIM 1 1 0.9971 1.186 502.5 0.185
PGD 1 1 0.9986 1.636 669.2 0.536
CW∞
most 1 1 0.9850 0.957 217.9 74.7
LL 0.95 0.96 0.8155 1.394 592.8 237.8
CW2
most 1 1 0.9069 0.836 120.5 13.2
LL 0.94 0.94 0.7765 1.021 204.5 23.1
CW0
most 1 1 0.97 2.189 59.5 662.7
LL 1 1 0.8056 3.007 207.5 794.9
TABLE 1: Evaluation of adversarial attacks.
(TA). A targeted attack example may fail being classified as the
target label and land on a misclassified label.
Mean confidence on adversarial class (AdvConf) is the
mean confidence on the adversarial class of successful adversarial
examples: 1n
∑n
i=1 p
∗, where ∗ denotes the misclassified class in
UA and the target class in TA.
Perturbation Distance Cost (Perturb) is measured by the
root mean square deviation:
√
||x−xadv||2
n for successful adver-
sarial examples.
Perception Distance Cost (Percept) is the human perception
distance metrics [17] on successful adversarial examples. Let Vi
be the pixel value for pixel i. Si be the 9 or 4 (corner) or 6
(edge)-pixel neighbors of pixel i and µ be their mean value.
Then the Standard Deviation of the patch area (PStd) around pixel
i is
√∑
Vk∈Si (Vi−µ)
n2 . The sensitivity (Sen) of pixel i is then
computed as Sen(i) =
{
1, PStd (i) ≤ 1
1
PStd(i) , PStd (i) > 1
. We compute
DistPercept by 1n
∑
i |δvi |Sen(Si). δvi denotes the perturbation
on pixel i.
Time cost (Time) measures the average generation time of a
single adversarial example and is measured in seconds.
We evaluate eleven adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet in Table 1 using the above metrics. Consider that some
attacks are expensive in per-example time cost, we select the first
100 correctly predicted benign examples in the test set to generate
attack examples. For FGSM, θ is set to 0.0156 for CIFAR-10 and
0.0078 for ImageNet, since with such a small θ it is sufficient
to cause a high attack success rate. For BIM, the per iteration θ
is 0.0012 and 0.002, and the maximum θ is 0.008 and 0.004 for
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet respectively. For CW attacks, the attack
confidence is set to 5 for both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, and the
maximum optimization iteration is set to 1000 since this setting is
sufficient for CW algorithms to achieve 100% attack success rate.
The adversarial example is fed into the target ML model every 100
iterations of optimization to check if the attack is successful. For
JSMA, the maximum distortion of the image is set to 10% instead
of 15%, the maximum default in paper [12].
2.3 Existing Defense Methods
Existing defense methods against adversarial examples can be
classified into three broad categories: adversarial training, gradient
masking, and input transformation.
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Adversarial training defense techniques retrain the attack
target model by using both benign training set and adversarial
examples generated using known attack algorithms [1], [18] in
order to improve the generalization of the target model in the
presence of adversarial attacks. PGD adversarial training with
random restart [10] and multi-model-training on adversarial exam-
ples [19] are the two most recent and more advanced adversarial
training algorithms. Adversarial training can be seen as giving
the target model a set of flu-shots, one per attack algorithm, and
thus, adversarial training defense can be effective against known
attacks. However, it also suffers from the attack-dependent training
and fails to generalize and against other attacks.
Gradient masking defense techniques add an additional layer
of training to reduce the sensitivity of a trained model in response
to small changes in input data. The main idea is to obfuscate
the gradient information or use a near-zero gradient to off-set
or minimize the impact of gradient information manipulation
performed by an adversary. [20] adds a gradient penalty term in
the model training objective, which is a summation of the layer-
wise Frobenius norm of the Jacobian matrix. The gradient penalty
makes the target model less sensitive to small perturbations in
input, but notably reduces the accuracy and learning effectiveness
of the target model. Defensive distillation [21] replaces the last
layer with a defensive softmax function and a temperature knot to
control the extent of distillation after training.
Input transformation applying careful input manipulation
techniques to the input data before sending it to the target predic-
tion model. Some popular image processing techniques like binary
filters and median smoothing filters are employed in [22] to per-
form feature squeezing on input data. Other input transformation
solutions include PixelDefend [23], information encoding [24]
image quilting and total variation minimization [25], randomness
[26] or region sampling [27]. The dimension reduction techniques
include the PCA projection of benign training data with the top
k principle axes [28] and the DNN denoising autoencoders [20],
[29], [30], which learns the latent space representation on training
data and leverages the latent patterns to detect adversarial inputs.
Defense on OOD Inputs. The first out-of-distribution detec-
tion method, proposed by the work [14], adds small perturbations
to the input data by softmax-controlled input preprocessing and is
often referred to as the baseline. One way to improve the baseline
method is to combine the input noise injection with output tem-
perature scaling by distillation temperature control [6]. However,
both detection methods rely on a proper setting of the input noise
amount parameter and the output temperature parameter, which
are dataset-specific. Another proposal utilizes the Mahalanobis
distance with respect to the closest class conditional distribution
to flag both out-of-distribution examples and adversarial perturbed
examples [5]. Other methods include training robust classifier
against out-of-distribution data [31], GAN-based detection [32]
and semantic representation [33].
Limitations of Existing Defenses. (1) Existing defense meth-
ods are sensitive to certain magic parameters inherent in their
design, such as the percentage of adversarial examples in a
batch in adversarial training, the temperature in Defensive Dis-
tillation, the detection threshold trained on benign dataset and
adversarial inputs in both input transformation and denoising
auto-encoder detector defense. Such dataset-specific and/or attack
algorithm-specific control parameters make the defense methods
non-adaptive [34]. (2) Existing detection only defenses are either
limited to either out-of-distribution inputs or adversarial examples,
whereas other defense methods can only defend adversarial exam-
ples but not able to detect OOD input. We argue that a defense
system is practical if it is attack-independent and can generalize
over attack algorithms. A robust defense approach should not
depend on finding the attack-specific or dataset-specific control
knob (threshold) to distinguish the adversarial inputs from the
benign inputs and to detect and flag those out of distribution
inputs. XEnsemble is developed to promote high robustness and
high defensibility of the DNN model against both adversarial
examples and out-of-distribution inputs.
3 XENSEMBLE SOLUTION APPROACH
3.1 Overview
During the prediction phase, adversarial examples are sent to the
prediction APIs to cause misclassification. Our past work [4] iden-
tified that different DNN models tend to have different gradient
information and thus an adversarial example is often misclas-
sified inconsistently across the different models. For untargeted
attacks, such adversarial divergence is reflected by different attack
destination classes of the same input. For targeted attacks, the
same adversarial example often results in different most-likely and
least-likely attack target classes under different prediction models.
Although adversarial examples are transferable from one model
to another [7], the transferability across different DNN models is
not consistent, and the transferability is relatively more severe
for untargeted attacks but less so for targeted attacks. For the
same adversarial example, the probability of being misclassified
by different models to the same wrong class label is not high.
Meanwhile, different inputs from the same class also demonstrate
some inconsistency under a single model: different destination la-
bels in untargeted attacks and different most-likely and least-likely
attack labels in targeted attacks [4]. For OOD inputs, we observe
that the provided wrongly-predicted label, even under noise with
the same distribution and different appearance, is different due to
the exhibited uncertainty [35]. Since both adversarial example and
OOD input cause misclassification and both have a low probability
of being misclassified to the same wrong class, such prediction
discrepancy can be utilized to build a robust prediction model to
defend the out-of-distribution input.
Motivated by the characterization of adversarial examples [4],
we argue that a robust defense should meet the following two
design objectives simultaneously: (1) It should provide a uniform
defense architecture that can generalize over both attack algo-
rithms and datasets, and be capable of defending against both
adversarial examples and out-of-distribution examples simultane-
ously. (2) It should be capable of distinguishing the adversarial
examples that can be repaired from those that cannot, aiming
to maximize the auto-repairing effectiveness. It should also be
capable of maximizing the detection rate on the out-of-distribution
examples to reduce or minimize the misclassification rate.
We propose to develop XEnsemble, an input-output model
verification ensemble defense methodology. XEnsemble is by
design unique in two aspects. First, it promotes the composition
of disagreement diversity ensembles using high accuracy base
models instead of weak models. Second, it combines input ver-
ification with output verification using ensemble techniques based
on both denoising and failure independent redundancy. XEnsem-
ble can protect a well trained DNN model at the prediction
phase without re-training the model using adversarial examples.
XEnsemble can be easily added as a plug-in to existing modern
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Fig. 2: Architecture of the XEnsemble defense system
neural network architecture. Figure 2 shows an architectural sketch
of the XEnsemble system. It combines diverse input denoising
techniques with disagreement diversity output verification tech-
niques. An input x submitted to a DNN model under protection
(target model) is first processed by k diverse input denoising
techniques, denoted by input df1, input df2, . . . , input dfk
(k ≥ 3). We require to choose only those techniques such that
both the target model and the ensemble member models have
high test accuracy, on par with their accuracy performance on
the original dataset. Second, for each of the k denoising input
versions of x, say xq , it will be sent to the output-verification
ensemble layer, which will select n model verifiers, denote by
output mg1, output mg2, . . . , output mgn (n ≥ 3) for out-
put model verification. XEnsemble will verify, repair and output
the defense-approved prediction outcome of the target model,
denoted by ST-def-out(x). The two ensemble size parameters k
and n for input denoising process and output model verification
are chosen either randomly or by using specific diversity ranking
criteria [36]. Consider output model verification, we first con-
structed a pool of base models that have diverse network structure
or backbone algorithm compared to the target model. This base
model pool can be obtained by training new models from scratch
or by leveraging the model zoo of pre-trained models for the
same task [22]. Then, we compute the ensemble diversity score
for each combination of ensemble teams of size 2 or larger from
the base model pool. For a base model pool of size M=3, 5 or 10,
we will have a total of 3, 26, 1013 ensemble teams. In our first
prototype of XEnsemble, we use the κ method [37] to compute
the κ value for each team as the prediction disagreement measure.
Third, upon receiving multiple versions of the input x from the
input denoising layer, we select an ensemble team from the list
of top-ranked ensembles by their ensemble diversity scores, we
send each of the k input versions to the chosen diversity ensemble
and collect the total of k × n prediction results. We combine
these results by ranking them against a pre-defined confidence
level and output the verified prediction results if the degree of
the prediction agreement is higher than the pre-defined confidence
level, and otherwise, we flag the input (when the agreement is
below the threshold). Algorithm 1 provides a procedural sketch of
the XEnsemble method.
We would like to note that the concept of input denoising
and the ensemble diversity are general and applicable to different
data modalities, such as image, audio, and text. For example,
quantization, filtering, and Gaussian smoothing can be applied to
image data; spectral subtraction and Wiener filtering are effective
Algorithm 1: Workflow of XEnsemble
1: Inputs:
x0: query data, mg0: target prediction model, k: number of
input-denoising modules, n: number of output verification models, T: L1
ranking confidence level
2: ensemble preparation
3: select k input-denoising methods df1, df2, ..., dfk with expertise in
processing different kinds of noise.
4: generate a base model pool according to the target model and the
prediction task
5: from the base model pool, create a diversity ensemble model pool using
κ metric or other diversity metrics.
6: given the diversity ensemble model pool, get top m model ensembles
with n models: {mg1,mg2, .., .mgn}1,...,m.
7: ensemble prediction
8: generate multiple denoised version of querry: x1, ..., xk from x0 via
different noise reduction techniques df1, df2, ..., dfk .
9: feed x0, x1, ..., xk to all models in the selected ensembles
{mg1,mg2, .., .mgn}1,...,m and get ensemble prediction results
10: ranking prediction made by
{mg1(x0), .., .mgn(x0)}i, ..., {mg1(xk), .., .mgn(xk)}i, where
i ∈ {1, ...,m}
11: if L1 distance ranking of the selected ensemble < ranking confidence
level then
12: output XEnsemble verified prediction results
13: else
14: flag the deception input and output a watchout alert.
15: end if
for audio data. In the rest of the paper, we describe in detail our
prototype implementation system using the image classification
learning as an example application domain. Hence, the input
denoising ensemble methods and the output verification ensemble
methods are tailored accordingly. We consider three threat sce-
narios for XEnsemble system when an adversary attacks victim
model (target model) based on the level of knowledge about the
XEnsemble defense system: (1) zero knowledge (black-box threat
model), (2) partial knowledge (grey-box threat model), and (3) full
knowledge (insider adversary) (white box threat model). We first
show that when attackers can launch white box attack to the target
model but have no prior knowledge of XEnsemble protection. This
is the common scenario that is used in the literature for defense
proposals. We will also discuss the scenario where attackers have
partial (grey box threat) or full knowledge (white box threat) of
XEnsemble defense in addition to the target victim model.
3.2 Input Verification Ensemble
The main goal of input verification is to apply multiple data
modality-specific input noise reduction techniques to clean the
input and produce denoised versions of the input, aiming to
remove adversarial perturbations or detect the out of distribution
inputs and to make the first attempt to prevent adversarial mis-
classification. While the benign input and their denoised version
are prone to be correctly classified, Our work [4] shows that the
adversarial example and its denoised counterparts will demon-
strate prediction discrepancy. While the location of the attack
perturbation is carefully chosen and the amount is minimized to
meet the imperceptibility, input denoising is applied uniformly on
the entire image and is by design to preserve the semantic and
visualization quality of the input image. We argue that the input
noise reduction techniques should be chosen to preserve certain
verifiable properties, such as the test accuracy of the target model
on benign inputs, while capable of removing the adverse effect
from an adversarial input.
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Attack benign FGSM BIM PGD CW∞ CW2 CW0 JSMA averageUA most LL most LL most LL most LL
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
no defense 0.9484 0.15 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.021
quan-1-bit 0.2111 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.2 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.163
quan-4-bit 0.9311 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.43 0.73 0.54 0.82 0.08 0.08 0.3 0.2 0.345
medFilter-2*2 0.8929 0.38 0.56 0.40 0.73 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.74 0.715
medFilter-3*3 0.7502 0.42 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.626
NLM-11-3-2 0.9421 0.2 0.25 0.67 0.36 0.74 0.38 0.78 0 0.01 0.22 0.12 0.339
NLM-11-3-4 0.9118 0.27 0.46 0.35 0.57 0.85 0.64 0.9 0.05 0.11 0.46 0.32 0.453
NLM-13-3-2 0.9414 0.19 0.26 0.54 0.37 0.75 0.38 0.81 0 0.01 0.27 0.12 0.336
NLM-13-3-4 0.9083 0.27 0.45 0.35 0.59 0.85 0.63 0.87 0.05 0.13 0.47 0.32 0.453
rotation -12 0.8335 0.33 0.52 0.54 0.61 0.73 0.65 0.76 0.32 0.5 0.47 0.34 0.525
rotation -9 0.8529 0.28 0.5 0.57 0.64 0.79 0.67 0.8 0.27 0.45 0.49 0.36 0.529
rotation 3 0.853 0.27 0.33 0.50 0.55 0.71 0.58 0.7 0.15 0.4 0.36 0.22 0.434
rotation 6 0.8493 0.26 0.41 0.50 0.57 0.7 0.62 0.72 0.22 0.47 0.4 0.3 0.470
med 2*2, rot -12, NLM-13-3-4 0.8927 0.38 0.60 0.67 0.72 0.89 0.75 0.91 0.36 0.84 0.67 0.76 0.686
Im
ag
eN
et
no defense 0.695 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0 - - 0.012
quan-1-bit 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.22 - - 0.270
quan-4-bit 0.695 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.31 0.76 0.47 0.82 0.1 0.58 - - 0.354
medfilter-2*2 0.65 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.68 0.82 0.74 0.85 0.84 0.85 - - 0.616
medfilter-3*3 0.61 0.33 0.41 0.37 0.7 0.8 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.82 - - 0.637
NLM-11-3-2 0.7 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.75 0.43 0.87 0.04 0.25 - - 0.316
NLM-11-3-4 0.66 0.1 0.25 0.21 0.59 0.83 0.68 0.84 0.2 0.5 - - 0.467
NLM-13-3-2 0.7 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.32 0.75 0.46 0.87 0.04 0.27 - - 0.328
NLM-13-3-4 0.665 0.11 0.26 0.23 0.59 0.84 0.68 0.87 0.2 0.51 - - 0.477
rotation -12 0.62 0.41 0.55 0.51 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.68 0.64 - - 0.642
rotation -9 0.635 0.39 0.53 0.48 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.8 0.69 0.72 - - 0.661
rotation 3 0.68 0.29 0.44 0.40 0.71 0.83 0.76 0.82 0.65 0.78 - - 0.631
rotation 6 0.68 0.33 0.49 0.46 0.78 0.85 0.79 0.83 0.72 0.74 - - 0.666
med-3*3, rot -9, rot 6 0.75 0.53 0.64 0.65 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.89 - - 0.802
TABLE 2: Defense accuracy of different feature denoising techniques for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet
Fig. 3: CIFAR-10 input-layer defense under 6 attacks.
For image classifiers, image smoothing and image augmenta-
tion techniques are popular for image noise reduction [38]. The
former includes pixel quantization by color bit depth reduction,
local spatial smoothing, and non-local spatial smoothing. The
latter include image rotation, image cropping, and rescaling, image
quilting and compression. Although these techniques are not
designed to remove the injected noise directly, they can be utilized
to make the perturbation less or no longer effective. In the first
implementation of XEnsemble, four techniques are implemented
using the Scipy library [39] and OpenCV [40].
Rotation method is a standard image geometric transformation
technique provided in SciPy library, rotation preserves the geomet-
ric distance of the image and does not change the neighborhood
information for most of the pixels except for the corner cases. In
our prototype defense, the rotation degree is varied from -12 to 12
with an interval of 3 degree.
The Color-depth reduction is another technique that reduces
the color depth of 8 bits (28 = 256 values) to i bits (2i values).
If i = 1, then the bit quantization will replace the [0,255] space
to 1-bit encoding with 2 values: it takes 0 when the nearby pixel
value is smaller than 127 and takes 1 when pixel values are in the
range of [128, 255]. We use quan-i-bit to denote the quantization
of the input image from the original 8-bit encoded color depth to
i-bit (1 ≤ i < 8).
The local spatial smoothing technique uses nearby pixels to
smooth each pixel, with Gaussian, mean or median smoothing. A
median filter runs a sliding window over each pixel of the image,
where the center pixel is replaced by the median value of the
neighboring pixels within the window. The size of the window
is a configurable parameter, ranging from 1 up to the image size.
MedFilter-k∗k denotes the median filter with neighborhood kernel
size k ∗ k. A square shape window size, e.g., 2 × 2 or 3 × 3, is
often used with reflect padding.
The Non-local spatial smooth (NLM) technique smooths
over similar pixels by exploring a larger neighborhood (11 × 11
search window) instead of just nearby pixels and replaces the
center patch ( size of 3× 3) with the (Gaussian) weighted average
of those similar patches in the search window. NLM-a-b-c denotes
non-local means smoothing filter with searching window size a∗a,
patch size b ∗ b and Gaussian distribution parameter c. NLM 11-
3-4 refers to the NLM filter with 11 × 11 search window, 3 × 3
patch size and the filter strength of 4.
Table 2 shows the results of input-denoising layer. In this set
of experiments, we feed each denoised version to the target model
and we show the performance of individual denoising technique
and one example denoising ensemble for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
respectively. We make several interesting observations. First, em-
ploying an input noise reduction technique can always improve
the robustness of the target model compared to the no-defense
scenario. However, there is no single input denoising method
that is effective across all 11 attacks. Each technique is good at
removing some types of noise but not the other. Second, not all
noise reduction techniques exhibit consistent performance across
different datasets trained with different models (e.g., CIFAR-
10 with DenseNet and ImageNet with MobileNet as shown in
Table 3). Another interesting observation is that the least-likely
attacks are relatively easier to defend than the most-likely attacks.
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One reason could be that the perturbation in the least-likely attacks
is larger and the denoising techniques may work more effectively.
In comparison, removing the carefully injected tiny noise in
the most-likely attacks may become harder. Finally, we observe
that the input denoising ensemble (see last row of each dataset)
show stronger defense compared to individual technique alone,
while offering competitive benign test accuracy and providing
significantly improved robustness under all 11 attacks. Figure 3
shows an intuitive illustration for CIFAR-10.
3.3 Output Verification Ensemble
Ensemble Diversity. We define ensemble diversity in terms of
both model structure-based diversity and model disagreement-
based diversity [41]. We say that an ensemble meets the structural
diversity if the member models of an ensemble are trained using
different training process, such as varying training dataset, initial
weight filters, neural network structure, neural network algorithm
employed (e.g., LeNet, VGG, MobileNet, ResNet-50, ResNet-101,
ResNet-152), or by using different settings of hyperparameters
(e.g., feature vector size, mini-batch size, # epochs, # iterations,
learning rate functions, optimization algorithms). Thus, the struc-
tural diversity of ensemble is related to the diversity inherent
in the algorithms and the hyperparameter settings used for the
DNN model training. The disagreement diversity of an ensemble
is related to the outputs of the DNN ensemble, which promotes the
failure independence of ensemble member models and increases
the overall predictive performance (accuracy).
Several popular diversity metrics, e.g., kappa statistics [37],
Q statistic [42], correlation coefficient, fail/non-fail disagreement
measure [43]), double-fault measure [44] can be used for select-
ing most disagreement-diverse models from the Nout baseline
candidate models trained over the same benign training set. In
the first prototype of XEnsemble, we use the Kappa κ statistics,
a pairwise metric, to measure the diversity degree between two
models using negative examples. Let N denote the number of
prediction results, K denote the number of classes, Nij denote
the number of instances labeled as class i by one model and as
class j by the other model. The κ metric is defined by
fκ =
∑K
i=1Nii
N −
∑K
i=1 (
Ni∗
N − N∗iN )
1−∑Ki=1 (Ni∗N − N∗iN ) (1)
In Equation 1,
∑K
i=1Nii
N computes the percentage of agreement
made by the two classifiers i and j under the same series of
queries.
∑K
i=1(
Ni∗
N − N∗iN ) computes the chance of agreement
in which the ∗ is any label in the output space. κ value is closer
to 1 when two models have more agreements, and is closer to
0 if there is more discrepancy. The disagreement diversity of an
ensemble team of size M is computed by averaging all pairwise
κ values of its member models.
Creating Diversity Ensemble. We develop a two-step di-
versity ensemble creation algorithm: First, we create a pool of
candidate ensemble member models, or so-called base models.
Each base model should meet the following two criteria: (1) the
structure-based ensemble diversity, and (2) the high benign test
accuracy comparable to that of the target model. For benchmark
datasets like CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-1000, instead of
training N redundant DNN models, one can also collect those pre-
trained DNN models on these benchmark datasets from the public
domain. Although generating a pool of base models for datasets in
some application domain can be potentially expensive, there are
several recent efforts [45], [46] present encouraging mechanisms
to create multiple base models conveniently, such as within a
single training phase using Snapshots. Second, we need to create
disagreement-based ensemble teams from the base model pool.
This can be carried out by finding all the subsets of the base model
pool of size P, which meet the following two constraints: (i) we
want to include the target model in every defense ensemble; and
(ii) we want to remove all ensemble teams of size 2. Thus, instead
of considering 2P subsets, we only need to consider 2P−2 subsets
to create the pool of disagreement-based diversity ensemble teams
from a base model pool of size P . We refer to those subsets
as the ensemble candidate teams. For each candidate teams, we
compute its ensemble disagreement score based on the chosen
diversity metric, such as the Kappa κ value. Then we rank all
2P−2 candidate ensemble teams by their κ scores and form a
pool of κ ensembles by selecting the top-ranked ensemble teams
whose κ values are lower than the system-defined κ diversity
threshold. The lower the κ value of an ensemble, the higher the
disagreement-based ensemble diversity.
Defense with Output Verification Ensemble. The output
verification ensemble defense involves two problems: (1) We
need to develop robust ensemble consensus methods, which can
effectively combine, rank, and integrate predictions from members
of an ensemble committee to produce the ensemble prediction
output with high accuracy, aiming to improve the robustness of
the target model under protection against in adversarial examples
and out-of-distribution examples. (2) At prediction phase, for
each query input, one ensemble team should be chosen randomly
from the disagreement diversity ranked pool of ensemble teams
as the chosen output verification team to verify and repair the
prediction of the target model by simply providing the ensemble
recommendation as the verified output of the target model.
There are several consensus methods for combining the out-
puts of multiple models in an ensemble of size M . For ex-
ample, an ensemble output can be created by aggregating the
outputs from its M member DNN models via simple averaging
(or sum, max, median, min) or a weighted averaging method.
The weighted averaging embraces the relative accuracy of the
ensemble member DNN classifiers, e.g., the confidence of the top-
1 class label. In general, averaging and weighted averaging are
popular aggregation methods for the linear opinion pools. Voting
is a representative non-linear combining method, which combines
the individual votes from M member models using rank-based
information. The majority voting is the simplest method, which
chooses the classification made by more than half of the DNN
member classifiers. When there is no agreement among more
than 50% of the DNN member models, the ensemble result is
considered an error. The downside of the majority is the scenario
where 50% of an ensemble committee misclassify, and a majority
voting, in this case, results in ensemble error. The plurality voting
method improves the majority in the sense that the collective
decision is the classification reached by more DNN classifiers than
any other. A correct decision by the majority is inevitably a correct
decision by plurality, but not vice versa [41].
We illustrate the model verification ensemble defense against
adversarial examples and out-of-distribution attacks in Figure 4.
To show the ensemble with only structure diversity and the
ensemble with both structure and disagreement diversity, we verify
the prediction of the target model using five individual DNN
verification models as the pool of base models. We construct
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Fig. 4: An illustration of XEnsemble: model verification ensemble defense against adversarial examples and out-of-distribution attacks.
CIFAR-10 κ degree of disagreementDenseNet ResNet-20 ResNet-32 ResNet-44 ResNet-56 ResNet-110
TM: DenseNet 1 0.382 0.405 0.408 0.44 0.425
VM1: ResNet-20 1 0.496 0.435 0.452 0.478
VM2: ResNet-32 1 0.46 0.469 0.507
VM3: ResNet-44 1 0.464 0.481
VM4: ResNet-56 0.49
VM5: ResNet-110 1
benign acc. 0.9484 0.9184 0.9228 0.9238 0.9277 0.9262
(a) Kappa statistic for CIFAR-10 models
ImageNet κ degree of disagreementMobileNet VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-50 Inception-v3
TM: MobileNet 1 0.238 0.318 0.307 0.365
VM1: VGG16 1 0.456 0.341 0.284
VM2: VGG19 1 0.33 0.285
VM3: ResNet-50 1 0.399
VM4: Inception-v3 1
benign acc. 0.695 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.67
(b) Kappa statistic for ImageNet models
TABLE 3: Baseline verification model pools for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet with benign test accuracy and pairwise κ measures.
ensemble teams of structure diversity by simply choosing a subset
of size 3 or larger from the base model pool, which we refer
to as the random ensemble team. We also construct a pool of
disagreement diversity ensemble teams, which we refer to as the
Kappa κ ensemble. We highlight those examples that are correctly
repaired in green by the random ensemble of a selection of base
models and by the Kappa κ ranked ensemble team and highlight
those that are detected as deceptive inputs in red, which are either
OOD inputs or adversarial examples that cannot be repaired by
the chosen ensemble team. We observe that the random ensemble
is less diverse compared to the Kappa κ ranked ensemble team.
For instance, two verifiers out of the random ensemble of three
base models (Random (VMs 2,4,5) have made misclassification
consistently into the same wrong class (VM2 and VM5), e.g.,
the adversarial input under CW2 attack is misclassified into cat,
and the two OOD inputs (Frog and cellphone) are misclassified
into deer and dog respectively. This comparison also shows the
importance of developing a comprehensive ensemble ranking
algorithm that takes into account not only the prediction outcome
but also other factors, such as the prediction confidence, the L1
distance of the verification vector to the target prediction vector. A
preliminary version of XEnsemble on the robustness of adversarial
example is provided in our conference version [47].
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.1 Output Verification Implementation
Datasets. Two popular benchmark datasets CIFAR-10 and Ima-
geNet are used for all experiments reported in this paper. The
CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60,000 color images of objects
with a size of 32*32 in 10 classes. 50,000 of them are training
data and the rest 10,000 are test data. The ImageNet dataset
is provided by the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Competition (ILSVRC) as a large-scale color image classification
benchmark. The dataset contains 1.2 million training images and
50,000 validation images in 1000 classes with a size of 224*224.
We also use the TinyImageNet data and LSUN data as the two
out-of-distribution datasets, which are fed into a DenseNet clas-
sifier trained on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 for the effectiveness
evaluation and comparative analysis. CIFAR-100 dataset consists
of 50,000 32x32 color training images, labeled with 100 classes,
and 10,000 test images. TinyImageNet is a subset of the ImageNet
dataset, containing 10,000 test images from 200 different classes.
The Large-scale Scene UNderstanding dataset (LSUN) has a test
set of 10,000 images on 10 different scenes.
Creating Base Model Pool. For CIFAR-10 trained on
DenseNet with test accuracy of 0.9184, we create a base model
pool of 5 pre-trained models as candidate verifiers for the target
DenseNet model: ResNet-20, ResNet-32, ResNet-44, ResNet-56,
and ResNet-110, all obtained from Keras. For ImageNet trained
on MobileNet with test accuracy of 0.67, we utilize 4 pre-trained
models from Keras as the verification models (VMs) for the target
MobileNet model: VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet-50, and Inception-
V3. In addition to the structure-based ensemble diversity, we also
use the benign test accuracy as another criterion for our base model
selection decision, which requires each model verifier is trained on
the same dataset with the same learning task and has the benign
test accuracy comparable to that of the target model. Table 3 shows
that all base verification models for CIFAR-10 models have a
benign accuracy higher than 0.9184 and all ImageNet baseline
verification models have a benign accuracy higher than 0.67.
Creating Diversity Ensemble Pool. Next, we create a pool
of disagreement-based diversity ensembles by pruning those en-
sembles with low disagreement diversity. In the first prototype of
XEnsemble, we quantify the ensemble disagreement diversity us-
ing Kappa(κ) measure. Given that Kappa(κ) measure is a pairwise
method, we compute the Kappa(κ) score for a given ensemble of
size M by computing the average Kappa score, denoted by κ-
average, over all pairwise Kappa(κ) scores of an ensemble. We
identify the best Kappa(κ) ensemble team by selecting the top-1
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CIFAR-10 ImageNet
#model 2 3 4 5 #model 2 3 4
top 1 1,3 1,3,4 1,3,4,5 1-5 top 1 1,3 1,3,4 1-4
κ 0.408 0.43 0.441 0.453 κ 0.295 0.322 0.332
acc 0.9476 0.9604 0.9365 0.95 acc 0.775 0.755 0.805
top 2 2,3 1,2,3 1,3,4,5 - top 2 1,4 1,2,4 -
κ 0.424 0.431 0.446 - κ 0.296 0.324 -
acc 0.9285 0.9324 0.9301 - acc 0.77 0.75 -
top 3 1,4 1,3,5 1,2,3,5 - top 3 2,3 1,2,3 -
κ 0.428 0.435 0.448 - κ 0.318 0.332 -
acc 0.9198 0.8928 0.9256 - acc 0.75 0.745 -
TABLE 4: κ value and the benign ensemble accuracy of Top 3 ranked
κ ensemble teams of different sizes for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
ranked ensemble in the pool of disagreement ensemble. There are
different ways to create a pool of disagreement based verification
ensembles. Alternative to the approach discussed in Section 3.2,
we can build this pool by creating multiple κ ranked ensemble
list, one for each size of the ensembles such as 3, 4, 5, 6 for the
target DenseNet model (TM) on CIFAR-10 and the base model
pool of 5 different Resnet model verifiers. For each Kappa (κ)
ranked ensemble list of a given size, we add the verification
ensemble with the smallest average pairwise Kappa (κ) value to
the disagreement based ensemble pool. Table 4 shows the pool
of top-3 Kappa (κ) ensembles with ensemble prediction accuracy
and average pairwise κ value for both DenseNet on CIFAR-10 and
MobileNet on ImageNet-1000.
Ensemble Ranking. There are several ways to perform pre-
diction ensemble ranking. In our first prototype implementation,
we choose to use the L1 distance and the prediction confidence
as two metrics to design our ranking algorithm. We choose the
L1 distance because we only consider those verification models
with high benign test accuracy. Then, the predictions for a benign
example on both the target model and verification models should
be alike. Thus, the L1 distance of their prediction vectors should
be small and close to zero. At the same time, the predictions
for an adversarial example are likely to be quite different on
the target model and verification model. This is feasible since
the transferability on targeted attacks is weak. In the meantime,
transferability on untargeted attacks merely causes misclassifica-
tion and the misclassified destination different across prediction
models. Therefore, the L1 distance between prediction made by
the target model and by the verification is relatively larger (higher
than 1 and close to 2). Consider k verification versions to the
target model (TM), we produce a L1 ranking of all k prediction
outcomes. If the top-ranked recommendations have approximately
the same L1 ranking score, we use the prediction confidence for
each of the prediction recommendations to break the tie.
4.2 Defense Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate the effectiveness of our model verification ensemble
defense approach and compare it with other existing defenses by
a number of cost and effect metrics.
Defense Success Rate (DSR). DSR measures the success
rate of the defense system by verifying, repairing and flagging
adversarial examples and out-of-distribution examples.
Prevention Success Rate (PSR). PSR measures the percent-
age of adversarial examples and out-of-distribution examples that
are repaired and correctly classified by the defense.
Detection Success Rate (TSR). TSR measures the percentage
of adversarial examples and out-of-distribution examples that
cannot be repaired but are flagged by the defense.
When adversarial examples and out-of-distribution examples
are presented as threats to a target DNN model, the defense
success rate (DSR) is the sum of PSR and TSR, i.e., DSR
= PSR + TSR. Since there is no correct label for the out-of-
distribution input in a trained model, the PSR for OOD is 0 and
DSR equals to TSR. To better measure the detection performance
of XEnsemble, we also use the following common metrics to
evaluate the effectiveness of model verification ensemble defense
for detecting out-of-distribution examples in addition to TSR.
Detection error (DError) measures the error made both on
out-of-distribution and in-distribution data. It is computed by β(1-
TPR)+(1-β)FPR. TPR is computed by TP / (TP+FN), where TP
denotes the portion of correctly detected out-of-distribution exam-
ples and FN denotes the portion of OOD inputs that are considered
as in-distribution data. FPR is computed by FP/(FP+TN), where
FP is the proportion of in-distribution inputs that are identified
as out-of-distribution inputs and TN is the proportion of in-
distribution data that are identified correctly. We set β = 0.5.
AUROC is a threshold-independent metric that measures the
tradeoff between (1-FPR) and TPR. The range of AUROC is [0,1].
It can be interpreted as the probability that a positive example is
assigned a higher detection score than a negative example. The
better the detection performance is, the larger the AUROC will be.
4.3 Defending Adversarial Attacks on CIFAR-10
We evaluate the effectiveness of XEnsemble defense for verifying
and repairing the prediction decision made by the target model
in the presence of adversarial examples. This set of experiments
compares three different model verification ensemble defense
options: XEnsemble-rand, XEnsemble-κ-rand, and XEnsemble-
best-κ. XEnsemble-rand is an ensemble created from the base
model pool with structure-based diversity. XEnsemble-κ-rand is
an ensemble with disagreement diversity, selected randomly from
the Kappa ranked list of ensembles whose Kappa ensemble di-
versity measure is above the system-defined diversity threshold.
XEnsemble-best-κ is the ensemble with the highest diversity in the
Kappa κ ranked list of ensembles. For CIFAR-10, the XEnsemble-
best-κ ensemble is VM 1,3,4. We provide the defense performance
measurement in Table 5. We observe three interesting facts: (1)
XEnsemble strategy is always beneficial regardless whether it is
the random ensemble from the baseline verification model pool,
or the random κ ensemble from the pool of κ ranked ensemble
list, or the best κ ensemble. (2) the best κ model ensemble is
the most effective over all 11 attacks in terms of average defense
success rate (prediction accuracy). (3) When defending adversarial
example, the model verification ensemble defense is capable of
repairing most of the adversarial perturbed input with high PSR.
In particular, as shown in Table 6, DSR is further improved by
TSR when the verification cannot agree with each other.
Improvement with Input-Model Ensemble. In Table 6, we
also show the improvement of defense performance when we
combine the output model verification layer with the input defense
layer and build the input-model verification diversity ensemble. In
our prototype, we apply a median filter with window size 2*2, a
rotation with -12 degree, and a non-local mean filter NLM 13-
3-4 to the CIFAR-10 input and then feed the processed input to
multiple models. There can be other ways to combine the diverse
input processing techniques with diverse output models and we
consider it as future work. The input-model verification XEnsem-
bles improves the model XEnsemble defense significantly.
Effect of Transferability. The transferability of adversarial
examples is widely reported in literature [7]. An immediate
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C
IF
A
R
-1
0
combo benign FGSM∞ BIM∞ PGD∞ CW∞ CW2 CW0 JSMA0 averageUA most LL most LL most LL most LL
TM(no defense) 0.9484 0.15 0.08 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.034
VM1 0.918 0.64 0.77 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.8 0.83 0.59 0.53 0.6 0.33 0.682
VM2 0.923 0.6 0.75 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.8 0.78 0.66 0.56 0.58 0.35 0.674
VM3 0.924 0.59 0.73 0.83 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.56 0.5 0.61 0.35 0.648
VM4 0.928 0.59 0.7 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.59 0.42 0.56 0.32 0.64
VM5 0.926 0.62 0.72 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.39 0.675
XEnsemble-rand 0.8928 0.71 0.82 0.86 0.9 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.72 0.69 0.8 0.56 0.796
XEnsemble-κ-rand 0.95 0.76 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.9 0.93 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.65 0.837
XEnsemble-best-κ 0.9604 0.73 0.85 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.73 0.87 0.91 0.75 0.871
TABLE 5: Measurement of the Defense Success Rate on base models and XEnsemble on CIFAR-10
CIFAR-10 testacc
output verification ensemble (DSR/PSR/TSR) input-output verification ensemble (DSR/PSR/TSR)
XEnsemble-rand XEnsemble-κ-rand XEnsemble-best-κ XEnsemble-rand XEnsemble-κ-rand XEnsemble-best-κ
VM 1,3,5 VM 1-5 VM 1,3,4 VM 1,3,5 VM 1-5 VM 1,3,4
no attack 0.9484 0.8928/0.8775/0.0153 0.95/0.9412/0.0088 0.9604/0.9412/0.0192 0.9186/0.8826/0.036 0.9253/0.9079/0.0174 0.9446/8884/0.9446
FGSM 0.15 0.71/0.68/0.03 0.76/0.69/0.07 0.72/0.69/0.04 0.85/0.73/0.12 0.91/0.77/0.14 0.93/0.78/0.15
BIM 0.08 0.82/0.76/0.05 0.88/0.85/0.03 0.85/0.85/0 0.91/0.84/0.07 0.94/0.82/0.12 0.99/0.85/0.14
PGD 0.14 0.86/0.81/0.05 0.93/0.90/0.03 0.91/0.87/0.04 0.93/0.88/0.05 0.93/0.86/0.07 0.95/0.89/0.06
CW∞
most 0 0.90/0.87/0.03 0.91/0.87/0.04 0.97/0.96/0.01 0.92/0.90/0.02 0.94/0.86/0.08 0.97/0.88/0.09
LL 0 0.88/0.84/0.04 0.91/0.88/0.03 0.95/0.93/0.02 0.92/0.90/0.02 0.96/0.89/0.07 0.98/0.88/0.10
CW2
most 0 0.91/0.88/0.03 0.90/0.85/0.05 0.97/0.94/0.03 0.92/0.88/0.02 0.92/0.85/0.07 0.97/0.89/0.08
LL 0 0.91/0.87/0.04 0.93/0.87/0.06 0.94/0.93/0.01 0.99/0.90/0.09 0.98/0.86/0.12 0.99/0.91/0.08
CW0
most 0 0.72/0.68/0.04 0.73/0.68/0.05 0.73/0.70/0.03 0.97/0.93/0.04 0.94/0.87/0.07 0.98/0.92/0.06
LL 0 0.69/0.64/0.05 0.79/0.73/0.06 0.87/0.78/0.09 0.98/0.91/0.07 0.94/0.81/0.13 1/0.91/0.09
JSMA most 0 0.8/0.74/0.06 0.82/0.75/0.07 0.91/0.75/0.16 0.92/0.90/0.02 0.96/0.83/0.13 0.97/0.90/0.07LL 0 0.56/0.44/0.12 0.65/0.59/0.06 0.75/0.59/0.16 0.88/0.72/0.16 0.91/0.75/0.16 0.95/0.80/0.15
TABLE 6: Defense success measurements in DSR/PSR/TSR for alternative XEnsemble algorithms on CIFAR-10
attack\model TM VM 1 VM 2 VM 3 VM 4 VM 5 Bestκ
FGSM
UA
1 0.353 0.412 0.424 0.436 0.424 0.235
BIM 1 0.196 0.217 0.25 0.283 0.261 0.120
PGD 1 0.116 0.128 0.139 0.174 0.139 0.066
CW∞
most 1 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13 0
LL 1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0
CW2
most 1 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.11 0.1 0
LL 1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0 0
CW0
most 1 0.3 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.09
LL 1 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.09 0
JSMA most 1 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.1 0LL 1 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0
model average 1 0.127 0.133 0.135 0.160 0.132 0.046
TABLE 7: Transferability of adversarial examples to five CIFAR-10
verification models and the best Kappa ensemble team.
question one would ask is how the XEnsemble of multiple model
verifiers will cope with the transferability of adversarial examples.
Due to the limitation of space, we report the attack transferability
experiments only on the CIFAR-10 dataset. For CIFAR-10, we
measured the transferability of adversarial examples from the
target model (TM) on all 7 defense models and the Best κ en-
semble (TM, VM 1,3,4) (recall Table 6). The results are shown in
Table 7. In the ensemble, we measure transferability basing on the
following criteria. For untargeted attacks, we consider cases where
multiple models agree on the same wrong prediction as untargeted
transferability since strong prediction discrepancy will be captured
by the proposed defense and the query will subsequently be
flagged. For targeted attacks, we consider an adversarial example
is transferable only when it is being misclassified to the same
target label by other models.
We observe three interesting facts. (1) The untargeted attack
(by FGSM or BIM) is less effectively mitigated if we only use one
defense model due to transferability. (2) For all targeted attacks,
one additional DM model can reasonably reduce the transferabil-
ity. (3) The transferability to the Bestκ ensemble becomes very
small and mostly negligible. Combining the defense success rate
result for the Bestκ ensemble in Table 5 and the transferability
results for the Bestκ ensemble in Table 7, low transferability does
not necessarily mean that the adversarial example is correctly
classified, leaving us the space to further improve the performance
of XEnsemble. These observations are consistent with the result
in [7], which shows the existence of many weak transferability
scenarios across classifiers.
Comparison Study. We further strengthen the robustness
performance of XEnsemble with the input augmentation ensemble
and output model verification ensembleimaging smoothing . We
compare the effectiveness of input-model verification XEnsemble
solutions with 9 existing defense approaches from two categories:
defense with no detection and defense with only detection. The
former focuses on providing the correct prediction label for
adversarial examples and does not integrate the detection function.
Therefore, DSR= PSR and TSR=0. We consider Adversarial
Training (AdvTrain [1]), Ensemble Adversarial Training (En-
sTrain [18]), PGD-defense [10], Defensive Distillation (DefDis-
till [21]), and Input Transformation Ensemble (EnsTrans [26]) in
the defense with no detection category. defense with only detection
aims at flagging whatever input that is identified as adversarial
example and cannot provide a repaired label for these flagged
input, i.e. DSR = TSR and PSR=0. We consider Feature Squeezing
(FS [22]), MagNet [29], NIC [48] and LID [49].
For adversarial training, we use the adversarial training exam-
ples generated from FGSM with random θ within [0, 0.0156]. In
adversarial training ensemble, the adversarial example is generated
from 3 of the 6 models(TM+ 5VMs). For defensive distillation,
the temperature is set to 50. The input transformation ensemble
computes multiple randomly cropped-and-padded input image.
The ensemble size is set to 10 while the crop size is 28. The
comparison results are provided in Table 8. We make two interest-
ing observations: (1) On both adversarial attacks and OOD input,
the XEnsemble defense approach consistently and significantly
outperforms those prevention-only defense methods regardless
whether it is the random ensemble from the base model pool, or
the random κ ensemble from the pool of κ ranked ensemble list,
or the best κ ensemble. (2) Although defense with only detection
methods can have high defense success rate, they are passive
defenses by resigning from guaranteeing robustness, incapable
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CIFAR-10 defense benign FGSM∞ BIM∞ PGD∞ CW∞ CW2 CW0 JSMA0 OOD avgDSRUA most LL most LL most LL most LL TinyImageNet LSUN
no defense TM 0.9484 0.15 0.08 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.028
Defense
with no
detection
Advtrain 0.879 0.64 0.58 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.44 0.48 0.5 0.45 0 0 0.516
EnsTrain 0.8985 0.69 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.59 0 0 0.571
PGD-defense 0.8675 0.76 0.68 0.86 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.86 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.64 0 0 0.61
DefDistill 0.9118 0.6 0.65 0.64 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.60 0.69 0.70 0.47 0 0 0.598
EnsTrans 0.8014 0.23 0.4 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.19 0.34 0.45 0.41 0 0 0.375
Defense
with only
detection
FS 0.894 0.133 0.55 0.667 0.64 1 0.83 1 0.73 1 0.041 0.298 0.802 0.774 0.651
MagNet 0.873 0.92 1 1 0.94 1 0.97 1 0.75 0.95 0.85 0.96 0.928 0.968 0.941
NIC 0.912 1 1 1 1 1 0.94 1 0.95 1 0.90 0.99 0.905 0.921 0.969
LID 0.944 0.53 0.52 0.69 0.69 0.84 0.67 0.85 0.73 0.82 0.76 0.69 0.877 0.949 0.733
Prevention
and
detection
XEnsemble-rand 0.9186 0.85 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.88 0.996 0.986 0.939
XEnsemble-κ-rand 0.9253 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.998 0.992 0.943
XEnsemble-best-κ 0.9446 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 1 0.97 0.95 0.998 0.996 0.975
TABLE 8: Comparison of XEnsemble with existing defenses on CIFAR-10. DSR=PSR+TSR, TSR=0 for the defenses with no detection and
PSR=0 for the defenses with only detection (highlight the best in bold for each category
Im
ag
eN
et
combo benign FGSM∞ BIM∞ PGD∞ CW∞ CW2 CW0 averageUA most LL most LL most LL
TM(no defense) 0.695 0.01 0 0 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0 0.014
VM1 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.8 0.79 0.793
VM2 0.68 0.7 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.76 0.799
VM3 0.67 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.8 0.825
VM4 0.735 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.9 0.91 0.84 0.889
XEnsemble-rand 0.77 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.923
XEnsemble-κ-rand 0.755 0.83 0.9 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.894
XEnsemble-best-κ 0.805 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.943
TABLE 9: Defense Success Rate measurement of ImageNet under adversarial attacks.
ImageNet testacc
model ensemble input-output verification ensemble
XEnsemble-rand XEnsemble-κ-rand XEnsemble-best-κ XEnsemble-rand XEnsemble-κ-rand XEnsemble-best-κ
VM 1,4 VM 1,3,4 VM 1-4 VM 1,4 VM 1,3,4 VM 1-4
no attack 0.695 0.77/0.67/0.10 0.755/0.69/0.065 0.805/0.67/0.135 0.785/0.68/0.105 0.745/0.675/0.07 0.90/0.715/0.175
FGSM 0.01 0.92/0.77/0.15 0.83/0.80/0.03 0.94/0.81/0.13 0.93/0.74/0.19 0.90/0.82/0.08 0.96/0.78/0.18
BIM 0 0.92/0.83/0.09 0.90/0.85/0.05 0.93/0.82/0.11 0.90/0.78/0.12 0.92/0.85/0.07 0.99/0.81/0.18
PGD 0 0.91/0.83/0.08 0.89/0.85/0.04 0.92/0.82/0.10 0.92/0.84/0.08 0.91/0.86/0.05 0.97/0.82/0.15
CW∞
most 0 0.92/0.86/0.06 0.92/0.87/0.05 0.96/0.86/0.10 0.93/0.79/0.14 0.90/0.83/0.07 1/0.88/0.12
LL 0.04 0.94/0.85/0.09 0.91/0.85/0.06 0.96/0.84/0.12 0.94/0.80/0.14 0.92/0.87/0.05 0.93/0.89/0.04
CW2
most 0 0.91/0.85/0.06 0.92/0.87/0.05 0.95/0.86/0.09 0.91/0.79/0.12 0.90/0.84/0.06 0.96/0.84/0.12
LL 0.06 0.93/0.88/0.05 0.90/0.86/0.04 0.95/0.84/0.11 0.95/0.79/0.16 0.91/0.84/0.07 1/0.89/0.11
CW0
most 0 0.92/0.84/0.08 0.89/0.84/0.05 0.91/0.83/0.08 0.89/0.79/0.10 0.89/0.80/0.09 0.99/0.86/0.13
LL 0 0.95/0.79/0.16 0.89/0.83/0.06 0.97/0.81/0.16 0.94/0.76/0.18 0.88/0.77/0.11 0.97/0.82/0.15
TABLE 10: Defense details of XEnsemble on ImageNet. Number measured in DSR/PSR/TSR
of surviving the ML component for its routine function under
attack. While defense with only detection methods can be useful
in sensitive applications like malware detection, such defenses are
not suitable for mission-critical systems that cannot tolerate real-
time interruptions. Our method can achieve comparable defense
success rate and perform extremely well on the OOD input. (3)
the best κ ensemble is effective across all 11 attacks and the
winner for all 8 targeted attacks. Another merit of the input-
model verification XEnsemble is that many of the augmentation
techniques are non-differentiable. Therefore, the input ensemble
cannot be jointly optimized with multiple models to perform the
cross-layer attack.
4.4 Defending Adversarial Attacks on ImageNet
We next evaluate the effectiveness of XEnsemble on ImageNet
and provide the results in Table 9. For ImageNet models, the
XEnsemble-best-κ ensemble consists of the target model the VM
1,2,3,4 and provides the best defense for 8 out of 9 attacks.
Although the single-model accuracy of ImageNet is not as high
as CIFAR-10, the discrepancy between models plays an important
role in the proposed model verification ensemble defense when
auto-verifying the input. Particularly as shown in Table 10, the
defense success rate on ImageNet not only comes from the
competitive prediction accuracy(around 70%) of the individual
model but also results from the highly diverse predictions of the
same input under different models. Ensemble of these verification
models brings a prediction accuracy over 80% on the selected 100
attack inputs for each attack while flagged inputs contribute to an
additional 10% TSR to the DSR. Meanwhile, Table 10 also shows
the robustness improvement brought by the input defense layer.
Note that the JSMA attack is not included for ImageNet due to its
overwhelming overhead on the heuristic search of the pixel space
in high-resolution images during the attack generation. We also
observe that the benign test accuracy of all three XEnsemble en-
sembles and the input transformation ensemble defense are higher
than that of the target model, showing the power of ensemble
learning over individual members of the ensemble. Another merit
of the proposed defense is that it does not require a modification
nor re-training of the target DNN model under protection, which
can be very expensive for large-scale images such as ImageNet.
The experiments also indicate that the ensemble defense suc-
cess rate does not have a high correlation with the size of the
ensemble, thus high diversity ensemble of one size may have a
high accuracy comparable with those ensembles of other ensemble
sizes. Although the effects and benefits of diversity ensemble is
witnessed in our experiment and many other researches, there are
many issues worth further investigation, including the quantifica-
tion of ensemble diversity with theoretical formulation and the
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method setting
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
TinyImageNet LSUN TinyImageNet LSUN
DSR DError AUROC DSR DError AUROC DSR DError AUROC DSR DError AUROC
baseline [14] 0.82 0.225 0.941 0.854 0.098 0.954 0.27 0.39 0.71 0.258 0.396 0.707
ODIN
[6]
T=1000, N=0.0014 0.938 0.056 0.985 0.962 0.055 0.992 0.574 0.238 0.88 0.576 0.237 0.885
T=1, N=0.0007 0.876 0.087 0.969 0.906 0.073 0.973 0.546 0.252 0.863 0.548 0.251 0.864
T=1000, N=0.01 0.542 0.254 0.884 0.716 0.267 0.926 0.246 0.402 0.705 0.22 0.415 0.694
Mahalanobis [5] 0.95 0.05 0.988 0.976 0.047 0.993 0.894 0.078 0.974 0.928 0.061 0.98
Leave-out [50] 0.974 0.038 0.993 0.996 0.037 0.998 0.85 0.1 0.963 0.874 0.088 0.97
FS Defense
with only
detection
0.8016 0.1192 0.9226 0.7735 0.1358 0.9012 0.8534 0.0948 0.9693 0.8435 0.0962 0.9573
MagNet 0.9276 0.0547 0.9776 0.9678 0.0326 0.9835 0.4535 0.2952 0.8549 0.4217 0.3067 0.8326
NIC 0.9053 0.0694 0.9742 0.9212 0.0579 0.9726 0.8012 0.1174 0.9331 0.7992 0.1147 0.958
LID 0.8772 0.0774 0.9683 0.9487 0.0402 0.9792 0.7688 0.1331 0.9385 0.7876 0.1281 0.9484
XEnsemble-rand
our method
0.996 0.002 0.999 0.986 0.007 0.999 0.998 0.001 ≈ 1 0.99 0.005 ≈ 1
XEnsemble-κ 0.998 0.001 ≈ 1 0.992 0.004 ≈ 1 0.998 0.001 ≈ 1 0.992 0.004 ≈ 1
XEnsemble-best 0.998 0.001 ≈ 1 0.996 0.002 ≈ 1 ≈ 1 ≈ 0 ≈ 1 0.996 0.002 ≈ 1
TABLE 11: DSR, Detection error and AUROC Comparison of XEnsemble with representative out-of-distribution data detection techniques.
For methods that are not XEnsemble, the DSR is measured by (1-FPR at 0.95 TPR).
trade-off between diversity and accuracy in ensemble generation.
4.5 Effectiveness of Detecting OOD Inputs
We perform the out-of-distribution input detection experiment on
both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. We use the DenseNet CIFAR-
100 model with 76.65% benign accuracy as the target model and
create the ensemble pool for verification ensembles in a similar
manner as those in the previous set of experiments on CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet. The CIFAR-100 model pool consists of a
number of Wide-ResNet models: WRN-28-10 with 80.75% benign
accuracy, WRN-28-10-dropout with 81.15% accuracy, WRN-40-
4 with 79.27% accuracy, and WRN-40-10 with 81.7% accuracy.
The first parameter is the model depth and the second parameter is
the widen factor. For both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, We conduct
the OOD detection experiment by feeding the entire TinyImageNet
data and LSUN data, each 10,000 images, to a DenseNet classifier
trained for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For both TinyImageNet
and LSUN, we down-sample the data to size 32*32 to fit the
prediction classifier. Similar to the adversarial example, we set the
ranking confidence level to 0.5, meaning that we will flag and
reject the input as long as more than half of the model cannot
agree on their prediction.
We evaluate the effectiveness of XEnsemble against out-of-
distribution inputs by comparing it with four existing repre-
sentative approaches: (1) the baseline OOD detection [14], (2)
the ODIN for OOD image detection [6], (3) the Mahalanobis-
distance based OOD detection [5] and (4) the Leave-out classifier
ensemble based OOD detection [50]. To illustrate the influence of
hyperparameters in ODIN, we include the measurement of using
three different choices of ODIN parameters. Note that XEnsemble
defense is independent of both adversarial attacks and out-of-
distribution examples. Thus, unlike existing OOD defenses that
rely on setting certain detection thresholds based on the out-of-
distribution examples, XEnsemble verification ensemble approach
can achieve a high detection success rate independent of any
OOD-data specific threshold, or the noise level and temperature
scaling in ODIN. Thus, unlike the baseline OOD detector, ODIN,
and Mahalanobis-distance based detector, there is no FPR at
0.95 TPR measurement for Xensemble. FPR at 0.95 TPR is
the probability that a negative (out-of-distribution) example is
misclassified as positive (in-distribution) when the true positive
rate (TPR) is higher than 95%. We compare the DSR of our
method in detecting OOD input in Table 11 and compare it with
the detection accuracy of other methods when their TPR is 0.95.
Given the target model, since there is no correct prediction for
the out-of-distribution examples, the goal of our model verification
ensemble defense is to achieve a high defense success rate (DSR)
by maximizing the detection success rate (TSR). Table 11 shows
the results. The XEnsemble model verification ensemble defense
is able to effectively improve the detection performance for out-
of-distribution examples and has superior defense performance
against OOD input in all three evaluation metrics. Specifically,
the detection success rate for the XEnsemble defense on CIFAR-
100 is better than that on CIFAR-10. This is partly attributed to
the richer choice of prediction classes in CIFAR-100 such that the
wrongly predicted class for each OOD example is scattered more
in the prediction label space for CIFAR-100 classifiers.
5 LIMITATION AND IMPROVEMENT
We have demonstrated that the XEnsemble is effective against ad-
versarial examples and out-of-distribution inputs under the black-
box defense threat model in which the adversary has no knowledge
of the composition of the defense system (recall Section 3.1). In
this section, we evaluate the insider attack scenarios, in which the
adversary has partial or full knowledge of the XEnsemble system.
We refer to these two threat scenarios as grey box threats and
white box threats as defined in Section 3.1. As reported in [3],
[51], existing defenses fail to generalize over black box threats
in the sense that some defense methods work well for certain set
of attacks but fail under other types of attacks. Moreover, most
existing defenses are broken under the white box threat model
in which the attacker has full knowledge of the target system
(both the target victim model (TM), and the composition of the
defense ensemble). In this section, we evaluate the limitation of the
proposed XEnsemble approach: When and how it may be broken
by the cross-model ensemble attacks when a partial knowledge
(grey-box) or the full knowledge (white-box) of the defense
system is exposed to the adversary, such as insider snooping.
Experiment Setup. For grey-box attacks, we consider two
kinds of the adversaries: (1) the attacker knows some of the models
in the entire ensemble team of models and the ensemble is fixed
(grey-fix); and (2) the attacker knows some of the models in the
entire base model pool and the ensemble is randomly selected
for every query (grey-rand). Similarly, we consider two kinds
of white-box adversaries: (3) the attacker knows all of the base
models in the defense system and the ensemble team used for
prediction is fixed (white-fix); and (4) the attacker knows all of the
baseline models and the ensemble team is randomly selected for
every query (white-rand). We conduct the ensemble CW attack on
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ensemble
attack
CW∞ CW2 CW0 avg
DSR
exposed
modelmost LL most LL most LL
TM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TM
DM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DM 1
DM 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DM 2
DM 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DM 4
DM 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DM 5
black-box 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.91 0.962 TM
grey-rand 0.77 0.85 0.88 0.94 0.74 0.87 0.842 TM, DM 1,2
grey-fix 0.49 0.58 0.66 0.78 0.47 0.65 0.605 TM, DM 1,2
white-rand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TM, DM 1-7
white-fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DistPerturb 0.922 1.189 0.725 0.972 1.614 2.046 -
DistPercept 21.76 33.78 9.81 18.12 12.58 23.77 -
Time(s) 350.4 362.5 12.43 17.52 402.8 445.3 -
TABLE 12: Defense success rate under model verification ensemble
CW attack on CIFAR-10.
CIFAR-10 using the target DenseNet model and the 5 verification
models listed in Table 3. For the grey box scenarios, we assume
that the adversary knows 2 out of the 5 verification models (e.g.,
VM 1, 2). For the white-box scenarios, we assume that all 5 VMs
are known to the adversary. In both cases, ensemble models with
a ensemble size of 4 will be chosen. Table 12 shows the results,
measured by the defense success rate DSR on each verification
model or ensemble option. It also includes the attack costs for the
white-box scenario in terms of perturbation distance, perception
distance and time cost.
Empirical Analysis. (1) The robustness of our model verifica-
tion defense approach deteriorates as the adversary increases his
knowledge of the composition of the defense system. XEnsemble
defense achieves the robustness in terms of average DSR of
84.2% for grey-rand scenario, compared to 60.5% for grey-fix.
(2) Our approach fails completely with 0% DSR for white-box
scenarios (both white-fix and white-rand). Table 12 also lists the
attack costs for the white-box scenario. We see that the cross-
model ensemble attack shows the increased perturbation distance,
increased perception distance and significantly increased time cost
when compared to Table 1. We are encouraged by this preliminary
study result for two reasons. First, both grey-box and white-box
attacks are only experimented with our output model verification
ensemble layer with a small pool of 5 base models on CIFAR-10.
We did not incorporate the input-denoising layer ensemble, which
could add k times more alternative verifiers and also make the
ensemble attack harder to generalize. Second, the output model
verification ensemble defense used in this set of experiments did
not leverage Kappa diversity, which is another defense parameter,
if unknown to the grey-box adversary, would boost the robustness
of our defense approach.
Takeaway. we conjecture that (1) extending the size of the
baseline candidate set for output-layer verification model ensem-
ble is an important optimization since it can significantly increase
the cost for adversaries under grey-box or white-box scenarios;
(2) by incrementally adding new models of high test accuracy
to expand the baseline candidate model pool over time, we can
substantially boost the robustness of XEnsemble defense against
grey-box and white-box attacks, turning the white-box attack
into grey-box; and (3) by introducing randomization to the input
denoising layer, we will have the opportunity to further strengthen
the robustness and survivability of our defense approach.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented XEnsemble, an input verification and output
verification ensemble defense methodology with three novel fea-
tures. First, XEnsemble is capable of defending a DNN model
under protection by utilizing both model-structure diversity and
model-disagreement diversity. Second, XEnsemble improves the
robustness of the target DNN model by providing auto-repairing
and auto-detection capability in the presence of adversarial ex-
amples and out-of-distribution examples. Finally, the proposed
XEnsemble defense is attack independent. It does not require re-
training the target DNN model and can generalize over attack algo-
rithms as well as different out-of-distribution datasets. Evaluated
over eleven attack algorithms and two out-of-distribution datasets,
we show that XEnsemble can achieve a high defense success rate
on both adversarial and OOD inputs.
Our research continues along two directions: (1) We plan to
introduce randomization in both input denoising ensemble layer
and output model verification layer to add additional robustness
to the XEnsemble framework against insider attacks under grey
box and white box threat models to defense systems. (2) We plan
to extend the XEnsemble approach to other modalities, such as
video, audio, and text against adversarial attacks, such as [52].
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